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Does the Currency Board Matter? 
U.S. News and Argentine Financial Market Reaction 
 
Abstract 
Using a GARCH model, we study the effects of U.S. monetary policy and macroeconomic 
announcements on Argentine money, stock, and foreign exchange markets over the period 
January 1998 to July 2007. We show, first, that both types of news have a significant impact 
on all markets. Second, there are noticeable differences in reaction for different subsamples: 
Argentine money markets were more dependent on U.S. news under the currency board than 
after it was abandoned as the floating exchange rate partly absorbs spillover effects from the 
United States. Finally, we find that U.S.-dollar-denominated assets react less to U.S. news 
than peso-denominated assets, which suggests that the currency board was not completely 
credible during its final years. 
 
JEL:   E52, F33, G14, G15 
Keywords:   Argentina, Central Bank Communication, Financial Markets, Federal Reserve, 
Macroeconomic Announcements 
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1.  Introduction 
The impact of central bank communication and macroeconomic announcements on financial 
markets in the United States has been studied extensively. Concentrating on the formal and 
informal channels of central bank communication, many papers find that U.S. financial 
markets react to this news (e.g., Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007; Hayo et al., 2008). However, 
given that the United States is the world’s largest economy, it is likely that its economic news 
matters for other countries, too. There are several channels through which foreign 
macroeconomic shocks are transmitted to financial markets: The first channel is based on 
greater real economic integration via international trade.
1 An economic upswing in a closely 
integrated foreign country is bound to improve the domestic situation through increased 
imports and vice versa. The second channel is financial market integration based on high 
capital mobility. This channel carries the risk of contagion arising from shocks in other 
markets. The third channel is driven by monetary policy: Argentina pegged its exchange rate 
against the U.S. dollar and, therefore, had to follow U.S. monetary policy very closely. This 
also implies a greater sensitivity to U.S. news and a co-movement of short-term interest rates. 
Argentine is a particularly interesting emerging financial market. Given that it had a 
fixed exchange rate regime until February 2002, we expect U.S. developments to have a 
substantial impact on the Argentine economy.
2 Studying this period of recent Argentine 
economic history also allows an analysis of how financial markets in Argentina react to U.S. 
news after entering the new regime of flexible exchange rates with the U.S. dollar. Our 
analysis focuses on the influence of U.S. news on Argentine markets during “normal” times.
3 
Thus, it does not cover either the Argentine financial crisis, a period when domestic problems 
led to the breakdown of the currency board, or the recent financial crisis.
4 Contrasting the 
currency board regime with the floating exchange rate regime, we address three specific 
research questions: First, do U.S. central bank communication and U.S. macroeconomic 
announcements influence Argentine financial market returns? Second, does the creation of the 
currency board affect the strength of this effect? Third, was the currency board credible 
during its final years? 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we summarize 
previous work in this area and outline the contributions of this paper. Section 3 describes the 
                                                 
1 The trade share of Argentina with the United States is between 10 and 16 percent and declines during the 
sample period.
 
2 Wolf et al. (2008) provide a comprehensive overview of the technical functioning of currency boards and the 
macroeconomic challenges faced by countries that peg their exchange rate. 
3 Further information on the sample period is provided in Section 3. 
4 The Argentine currency board and its breakdown are discussed, for instance, in Bleaney (2004) and Gurtner 
(2004). 4 
construction of the news dummies and explains our data set as well as the econometric 
methodology. Section 4 reports our empirical results for the money, stock, and foreign 
exchange markets. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Related Literature and Our Contribution 
A large branch of the literature analyses the impact of macroeconomic announcements on 
financial markets (e.g., Bollerslev et al., 2000) or the co-movements of international financial 
markets (e.g., Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). However, to our knowledge, there are very few 
papers that study spillover effects of either U.S. monetary policy or U.S. macroeconomic 
announcements on emerging markets. Wongswan (2009) analyzes the response of global 
equity indices to U.S. monetary policy announcements. Using intraday data, he finds that the 
Argentine Merval Index falls significantly, by 6 percentage points, after a surprise hike of 100 
bps. However, when excluding intermeeting target rate moves, the coefficient becomes 
insignificant. Also employing intraday data, Robitaille and Roush (2006) examine the 
reaction of Brazilian sovereign yield spreads and stock prices to FOMC announcements and 
U.S. macroeconomic surprises. They find that announcements of a U.S. interest rate hike lead 
to an increase in bond spreads and a decline in the Bovespa index. Nonfarm payroll news, as 
well as CPI surprises, tend to raise spreads and lower share prices. Wongswan (2006) 
analyzes the transmission of U.S. macroeconomic announcements and interest rate decisions 
on financial markets in developing countries. Using high-frequency data, he concludes that a 
large and significant association exists between news originating in the United States and 
volatility, as well as trading volumes, in the Korean and Thai equity indices. 
Andritzky et al. (2007) investigate the reaction of emerging market bonds to U.S. 
macroeconomic announcements and target rate changes. Global bond spreads tend to respond 
more to rating actions and changes in U.S. rates than to the respective domestic news. U.S. 
macroeconomic data and policy announcements reduce uncertainty and stabilize spreads. 
Arora and Cerisola (2001) explore how sovereign bond spreads are influenced by U.S. 
monetary policy. They conclude that the stance and predictability of U.S. monetary policy are 
important for stabilizing capital flows and capital market conditions in emerging markets. 
Alper (2006) concludes that the unanticipated component of U.S. monetary policy is 
significant in explaining movements in emerging market sovereign bond spreads. 
In this paper, we study the effects of Federal Reserve (Fed) communications 
(including target rate movements) and U.S. macroeconomic announcements on money, stock, 
and foreign exchange market returns in Argentina. The inclusion of U.S. news (in addition to 5 
U.S. financial market returns) allows us to explore one of the sources of financial market co-
movement. Our sample time period (January 1998–July 2007) is particularly useful in this 
regard as it includes the change in the Argentine exchange rate regime. Econometrically, we 
employ a GARCH specification of daily financial returns to capture the autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity that characterizes many financial series. Our approach extends 
the existing literature in two ways. First, ours is a pioneering study of the effects of formal 
and informal communication by the Fed on Argentine financial markets. We employ a data 
set containing indicators based on speeches by Fed officials on the topics of monetary policy 
inclination and economic outlook. Previously, only actual target rate changes by the Fed have 
been studied. Second, this is the first paper to examine the different Argentine exchange rate 
regimes in this context. 
 
3.  Data and Econometric Methodology 
In our analysis, we use a subsample of the data set introduced and extensively described in 
Hayo et al. (2008). It includes summaries of 705 speeches and 159 congressional hearings, 
covering all members of the Board of Governors, as well as 72 postmeeting statements and 22 
monetary policy reports (MPR). The communication events are subjectively coded into 
dummy variables on the basis of their written content.
5 Following the literature (e.g., 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007), we categorize the communication content into a monetary 
policy and an economic outlook component. The coding for the U.S. economic outlook news 
is either “positive” (EO+) or “negative” (EO–), while “tightening” (MP+) or “easing” (MP–) 
are the categories for the Fed’s monetary policy stance. In the analysis, we employ dummy 
variables that are split into positive and negative news to account for possible asymmetric 
reactions of financial markets.
6 In total, there are 16 communication dummies as all four types 
(statements, MPR, testimony, speeches) can be coded into the four different categories EO+, 
EO–, MP+, and MP–. As there are no explicit expectation indicators about the content of an 
upcoming speech (like the Bloomberg survey before every meeting of the Federal Open 
                                                 
5 In designing these categories of news, we carefully read each speech twice, with a considerable time lag 
between each reading, and then coded them independently into the respective dummy categories. In the case of a 
conflict between the two codings, we checked the relevant speeches yet another time and adjusted our indicators 
accordingly. We employed extensive robustness checks to ensure that our results do not depend on the particular 
coding of ambiguous individual observations. Data are obtained from the official website of the Board of the 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
An alternative to subjective coding is using content analysis software (for instance, Lucca and Trebbi, 2009). 
However, communications other than postmeeting statements are not standardised and, thus, content analysis 
programmes fail to detect systematic patterns in these more complex texts.  
6 For example, this type of asymmetry can be found in the impact of IMF statements on financial returns in 
emerging markets (Hayo and Kutan, 2005). 6 
Market Committee), we cannot extract a surprise component from the communication events. 
Communication events occurring after market closure are assigned to the next business day. 
The surprise components of several macroeconomic indicators typically watched by 
financial market participants are also subject to examination. We choose the 10 news items 
from Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007): advance gross domestic product (GDP), industrial 
production, and trade balance to capture the growth expectations; the Institute for Supply 
Management (ISM) survey and the Conference Board consumer confidence for producer and 
consumer confidence; nonfarm payroll and the unemployment rate to proxy labour market 
conditions; retail sales for actual consumption; the consumer price index (CPI) and producer 
price index (PPI) for inflation. These variables enter Equation (1) separated into positive and 
negative impulse dummies on the day of their announcement.
7 
Our Argentine financial market indicators are comprised of daily closing interbank 
lending rates and daily returns on stock and foreign exchange markets over the period from 
January 2, 1998 to July 31, 2007.
8 We choose daily data instead of intraday data for two 
reasons. At a conceptual level, we are interested in the question of whether there are persistent 
economically important effects, rather than just short-term ups and downs. Furthermore, even 
though the scheduled delivery time of speeches is recorded on the central bank’s website, it is 
not possible to time the central bank news in precise in five-minute intervals, as can be done 
for newswire reports. 
As dependent variables, we employ (i) daily changes of the three-month Buenos Aires 
Interbank Offered Rate. Up to the time the currency board was abandoned, we examine both 
peso- and dollar-denominated interbank rates. We also assess (ii) the daily growth rates of the 
Merval Stock Index and (iii) the dollar/peso spot rate.
9 We split the sample into two 
subsamples: the first ends on June 29, 2001 and is called the ‘currency board subsample’.
10 
                                                 
7 We explore several specifications for U.S. macroeconomic news. In a first step, we test whether the actual 
values, the standardized shocks, or both have an impact on our financial market indicators. The shocks are 
significant, whereas the actual values remain insignificant. The same outcome occurs when including actual 
values and news dummies instead of shocks. In a second step, we discover that the results using news dummies 
weakly dominate the ones using standardised shocks in terms of significance and, therefore, we employ news 
dummies in the analysis presented below. 
8 Data sources: U.S. bond market and foreign exchange market series—Federal Reserve’s statistical releases H10 
and H15; stock market series—Yahoo! Finance database; Argentine interbank lending rates—Central Bank of 
Argentina statistical database; Surveys of macroeconomic announcements—Bloomberg newswire. 
9 Exchange rates are defined in price notation, which implies that an increase in the exchange rate indicates a 
depreciation of the peso against the dollar. The exchange rate is used as an endogenous variable only in the 
second subsample, as it was pegged until February 2002. 
10 In July 2001, the Argentine economic and financial crisis hit the money market as returns increased sharply. 
Markets displayed lack of confidence in the government’s plan to balance the budget and subsequently the 
country rating worsened. 7 
The ‘floating exchange rate subsample’ starts on January 2, 2003 and continues until the end 
of our sample window.
11 
Descriptive statistics show that all financial market series exhibit excess kurtosis 
(Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix). ARCH models increase estimation efficiency in time 
series characterized by volatility clustering (Engle, 1982). We start with a generalized version 
of the GARCH specification proposed by Bollerslev (1986) and apply a testing-down process 
to increase estimation efficiency: 
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where α0, α1, β1, μ, γ, δ, ζ, η, θ, ι, λ, and ν are parameters or vectors of parameters and εt|Γt-1 
= t(v), with Γt-1 capturing all information up to t–1, and t(v) a t-distribution with v degrees of 
freedom (Bollerslev, 1987). Contemporaneous financial control variables (returns on other 
Argentine markets, U.S. bond returns, U.S. stock returns, and growth rates of the EMBIG 
Latin spread) are excluded to avoid potential simultaneity problems. We also control for day 
of the week effects and movements in the Federal Funds Target Rate by including separate 
dummies for expected and unexpected rate hikes and cuts.
12 After estimating these rich 
GARCH(1,1) models, we exclude all insignificant variables in a general-to-specific approach 
(Hendry, 2000). 
 
4.  Analyzing the Effects of Fed Communication on Financial Market Returns 
Table 1 shows the impact of U.S. news on money market returns (Buenos Aires Interbank 
Offered Rate, Baibor) and on the main equity market index (Merval) during the currency 
board era. U.S. target rate changes are particularly important when they hit the markets as 
surprises. Both peso- and dollar-denominated money market rates increase after a 25 bps 
                                                 
11 In December 2002, the financial crisis effects on money markets decreased substantially after restrictions on 
peso-denominated bank withdrawals were relaxed and the government showed its ‘good faith’ by symbolically 
repaying some debt to several international organisations. 
12 Bloomberg surveys are used to identify surprises occurring at scheduled meetings. Intermeeting moves are 
naturally classified as surprises. For instance, a “surprise hike” can be (i) an unexpected rise in the target rate or 
(ii) an unchanged target rate when a rate cut was expected. 8 
surprise hike, whereas such news depresses equity returns.
13 Furthermore, expected target rate 
cuts decrease peso-denominated returns. Unexpectedly loose monetary policy also influences 
all three markets. The hike in equity returns is the largest reaction found across all news and 
assets.
14 The influence on money market returns is somewhat counterintuitive. However, three 
unexpected interest rate cuts took place at an unscheduled meeting, whereas the Fed cut its 
target rate by more than expected only once at a scheduled meeting. Further examination 
reveals that when the Fed cuts its target rate at an unscheduled meeting, financial market 
agents interpret the cut as a signal that the central bank has new information indicating that 
the U.S. economy will perform worse than expected, which then leads to an increase in 
foreign interest rates.
15 
Macroeconomic news is important only for peso-denominated and equity returns; 
dollar-denominated returns are unaffected by this type of news. A higher than expected CPI is 
interpreted as a sign of a possible interest rate hike in the near future and, therefore, 
significantly moves the money market returns up (an indication of the Fisher relationship) and 
the stock market down due to the increase in borrowing costs. We also observe falling money 
market rates after lower than expected CPI.
16 Worse GDP figures indicate a possible decrease 
in credit demand and, thus, cause interest rates to decline. 
Central bank communication is particularly important when it conveys negative news 
about the economic outlook. Not only does it indicate a decline in credit demand, but a 
negative economic outlook can also be interpreted as signalling a future interest rate cut. 
Therefore, speeches (postmeeting statements) decrease peso-denominated (dollar-
denominated) returns. A straightforward interpretation with regard to the equity market is that 
a negative economic outlook implies lower expected profits. As a consequence, equity returns 
are depressed by this type of news conveyed in MPR or congressional hearings. 
  
                                                 
13 The coefficients can be interpreted as follows. All target rate variables are coded as multiples of 25 bps. For 
instance, the coefficient 0.198 (–0.801) implies an increase of 19.8 bps (decrease of 80.1 bps) in the three-month 
peso rates (the Merval index) after a surprise hike in the U.S. target rate. In the case of macroeconomic surprises 
and central bank communication, we rely on news dummies. For instance, the coefficient 0.055 (–2.262) denotes 
an increase of 5.5 bps (decrease of 2.26 pp) in the three-month peso rates (the Merval index) after announcement 
of a higher than expected U.S. CPI. 
14 The influence is statistically larger than for target rate hike surprises (Chi
2(1) = 4.2*). 
15 All unexpected interest rate hikes took place at scheduled meetings. 
16 The influence of positive and negative CPI news is statistically equal (Chi
2(1) = 0.43). 9 
Table 1: Results for Currency Board Subsample (January 1998–June 2001) 
   3-Month Peso 3-Month Dollar Merval
α0  0.001 *     0.000       0.232  * 
α1  0.441 0.285 0.090 ** 
β1  0.559 ** 0.715 ** 0.872  ** 
Student-t dof  3.202 **     2.812 **     3.989  ** 
Endogenous 1st Lag  0.437 **  0.256 ** 
EMBIG Latin 1st Lag  –0.020 ** 
TR Surprise Hike  0.198 **     0.136 *     –0.801  ** 
TR Cut  –0.037 * 
TR Surprise Cut  0.088 *     0.105 **     3.272  ** 
CPI +  0.055 **  –2.262  ** 
CPI –  –0.040 ** 
GDP –  –0.096 ** 
Statement MP +                  –0.647    
Statement EO –  –0.150 * 
MPR/Testimony EO –  –1.174  ** 
Speech MP +  –0.750 
Speech EO –  –0.044 *                  
Exclusion Restriction  48.6 16.8 51.2 
ARCH 1-2 Test  0.002       0.017       0.105    
Notes: * (**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) level. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent 
(Bollerslev and Wooldridge, 1992). Number of observations: 839. 
 
The results for the floating exchange rate subsample are given in Table 2. Neither U.S. 
macroeconomic news nor target rate movements have any significant impact on money 
market rates. A U.S. target rate cut depresses equity returns, likely signalling the expectation 
of a recession in the United States and causing fear of negative effects for Argentine firms, 
but appreciates the peso against the dollar. A relatively higher Argentine rate then triggers 
additional capital imports, which lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate. 
Improving business confidence, as reflected by positive ISM news, increases 
Argentine equity returns. A lower than expected CPI moves the Fed’s monetary policy 
inclination toward an interest rate cut and, similar to what happens when there is an actual 
interest rate cut, the peso appreciates. Negative nonfarm payroll news, as well as negative 
retail news, indicate a worsening of the U.S. economy, which is reflected by depreciation 
against the peso. 
Central bank communication is relevant for all markets. First, in line with the finding 
for the currency board era, a negative economic outlook put forward in a MPR or in testimony 
decreases money markets returns. Second, a speech indicating a future target rate cut causes a 
decline in interest rates. Third, similar to the results for an actual interest rate cut, the peso 10 
appreciates after the mention of an interest rate cut in a MPR, testimony, or a speech. Finally, 
a dovish MPR/testimony indicates lower borrowing costs in the future and, therefore, causes 
higher equity returns. The same result is found for a speech implying a bright economic 
outlook as it signals an increase in expected profits. 
 
Table 2: Results for Floating Exchange Rate Subsample (January 2002–July 2007) 
   3-Month Peso Merval ARS/USD
α0  0.001 **     0.105 *     0.001  ** 
α1  0.308 0.091 ** 0.245  ** 
β1  0.692 ** 0.876 ** 0.755  ** 
Student-t dof          6.171 **     9.268  ** 
EMBIG Latin 1st Lag  –0.065  ** 
ARS/USD 1st Lag  0.068 *  0.159  ** 
Constant Term  0.173 ** 
Friday 0.037  ** 
TR Cut          –0.352 **     –0.237  ** 
CPI –  –0.105  * 
ISM +  0.612 * 
NFP –  –0.062  * 
RET –  –0.066  ** 
MPR/Testimony MP –          2.575 **     –0.745  ** 
MPR/Testimony EO –  –0.070 ** 
Speech MP –  –0.089 **  –0.817 –0.617  ** 
Speech EO +          0.684 *          
Exclusion Restriction  48.7 43.9 47.3 
ARCH 1-2 Test  1.132       0.543       2.060    
Notes: * (**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) level. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent 
(Bollerslev and Wooldridge, 1992). Number of observations: 1,106. 
 
A comparison of the results in Tables 1 and 2 reveals some interesting insights. First, 
we find that there are generally fewer significant news variables in the money market after the 
crisis than during the currency board era. In particular, neither central bank actions nor 
macroeconomic indicators exert a significant influence. We interpret this as evidence that the 
Argentine economy became less dependent on events in the United States and, particularly on 
U.S. monetary policy, after the currency board was abandoned.
17 
                                                 
17 To test for statistical differences between the currency board era and the floating exchange rate subsample, we 
estimate an unrestricted version of Equation (1) in both periods for the peso-denominated money market and the 
equity market, respectively. Tests of differences in means across the two samples are mostly insignificant, except 
for two cases. The influence of MPR/Testimony EO– on the money market is larger during the second 
subsample (z = 2.47*) and CPI+ shocks have a larger impact on the equity market during the currency board era 
(z = –3.07**). 11 
Second, neither communication about the future course of U.S. monetary policy nor 
any type of macroeconomic news triggers a significant reaction of dollar-denominated money 
market returns. In contrast, peso-denominated assets are affected by a variety of U.S. news. 
On the one hand, dollar-denominated assets are expected to react more strongly to U.S. news 
than are peso-denominated assets because of movements in the external value of the U.S. 
dollar. On the other hand, dollar assets are considered much safer investments than peso-
denominated assets and thus markets react less nervously to any U.S. news. The latter 
interpretation receives indirect support by the sharp increase in the spread between peso- and 
dollar-denominated assets at the beginning of the financial crisis. Thus, these findings can be 
interpreted as evidence that during its final years, the currency board was not completely 
credible and dollar-denominated Argentine assets were used as a ‘safe haven’. 
Third, our results provide evidence for the absorbing role of the exchange rate in the 
transmission of U.S. macroeconomic news to Argentine financial markets. In particular, we 
find the peso/dollar exchange rate to be strongly influenced by U.S. news during the second 
subsample, whereas the money market has a less pronounced reaction in this period than it did 
in the currency board era. Furthermore, money market returns are directly influenced by past 
foreign exchange returns. A depreciation of the peso against the dollar increases interest rates, 
possibly reflecting capital outflows and vice versa. 
Fourth, we generally discover Argentine financial markets mirroring the effects found 
for the United States (see, e.g., Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007; Hayo et al., 2008). For 
instance, a weak economic outlook decreases money market returns, whereas a higher than 
expected CPI reduces equity market returns. For investors, mirroring implies that the 
diversification opportunities between U.S. and Argentine financial markets may be limited. 
As a robustness test, we check whether the inclusion of Argentine macroeconomic 
announcements affects our results. To that end, we employ the surprise component of six 
Argentine macroeconomic announcements for which systematic Bloomberg expectation 
surveys are available: GDP, industrial production, trade balance, unemployment rate, 
government tax revenue, and CPI. These variables enter the reduced models presented in 
Tables 1 and 2, separated into positive and negative impulse dummies on the day of their 
announcement. Our results remain virtually unchanged.
18 Thus, in general, domestic news 
                                                 
18 Only two significant coefficients from Tables 1 and 2 are found to be marginally insignificant when 
controlling for Argentine macroeconomic news: (i) surprise interest rate cuts in the peso-denominated money 
market during the currency board era and (ii) positive ISM news in the equity market during the second 
subsample. To conserve space, we do not report these regressions. All omitted results are available on request. 12 
does not crowd out the effect of U.S. monetary policy and macroeconomics news on 
Argentine financial markets. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
We study the effects of many types of Fed communication and U.S. macroeconomic shocks 
on Argentina’s financial market returns. Using a GARCH model, we explore the impact on 
money, stock, and foreign exchange markets over the period January 1998 to July 2007 after 
splitting the sample into two, one subsample capturing the currency board regime, and the 
other the floating exchange rate regime. We concentrate our analysis on three research 
questions. 
First, do U.S. central bank communication and U.S. macroeconomic announcements 
influence Argentine financial market returns? We show that both types of news have a 
significant impact on money, equity, and foreign exchange markets. The impact is statistically 
significant and economically relevant (up to 3.3 percentage points during the currency board 
era). We generally find Argentine financial markets mirroring the effects found in the 
corresponding U.S. markets. As a consequence, investors should be aware that diversification 
opportunities between U.S. and Argentine financial markets could be limited. 
Second, does the creation of the currency board affect the strength of this effect? Yes, 
as we conclude that Argentina’s money markets have become less dependent on U.S. events 
after the breakdown of the currency board. There are fewer significant news variables in the 
floating exchange rate subsample compared with the currency board subsample. In particular, 
neither central bank actions nor macroeconomic indicators exert a significant influence. Our 
results provide evidence that the exchange rate acts as an absorber in the transmission of U.S. 
macroeconomic news to Argentine financial markets. 
Third, was the currency board credible during its final years? We find that Argentine 
assets denominated in dollars are generally influenced by fewer significant variables with 
smaller coefficients in absolute terms than are peso-denominated assets during the currency 
board subsample. Our results suggest that dollar-denominated assets are seen as safer than 
peso-denominated assets, which implies that the currency board was not regarded as 
completely credible by market participants during its final years. 
The results of this paper have some policy implications. First, a currency board fosters 
financial integration. We show that under the pegged exchange rate system, Argentine money 
markets react to the same set of macroeconomic variables as do U.S. markets. However, they 
are much less sensitive to U.S. news after the currency board was abandoned. Thus, financial 13 
integration between the two countries has decreased, which suggests that the currency board 
must have caused a higher degree of financial integration in the first place. 
Second, our results suggest that policymakers should consider real economic 
developments, in addition to monetary policy, in the anchor country before deciding to peg 
their currency. In a one-sided fixed exchange rate system, the anchor country’s central bank 
sets interest rates based on domestic conditions. Hence, through this channel, the anchor 
country’s domestic conditions have a direct influence on financial markets in the currency 
board country. Thus, even when there is not a particularly high degree of real economic 




Alper, C. E. (2006), U.S. Monetary Policy Surprises and Emerging Markets Sovereign 
Spreads, 2007 AEA Conference Papers. 
Andritzky, J. R., Bannister, G. J., and Tamirisa, N. T. (2007), The Impact of Macroeconomic 
Announcements on Emerging Market Bonds, Emerging Markets Review 8 (1), 20–37. 
Arora, V. and Cerisola, M. (2001), How Does U.S. Monetary Policy Influence Sovereign 
Spreads in Emerging Markets? IMF Staff Papers 48 (3). 
Bleaney, M. (2004), Argentina’s Currency Board Collapse: Weak Policy or Bad Luck, World 
Economy 27 (5), 699–714. 
Bollerslev, T. (1986), Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity, Journal of 
Econometrics 31 (3), 307–327. 
Bollerslev, T. (1987), A Conditional Heteroscedastic Model for Speculative Prices and Rates 
of Return, Review of Economics and Statistics 69 (3), 542–547. 
Bollerslev, T., Cai, J., and Song, F. M. (2000), Intraday Periodicity, Long Memory Volatility, 
and Macroeconomic Announcement Effects in the US Treasury Bond Market, Journal of 
Empirical Finance 7 (1), 37–55. 
Bollerslev, T. and Wooldridge, J. M. (1992), Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimation and 
Inference in Dynamic Models with Time Varying Covariances, Econometric Reviews 11 
(2), 143–172. 
Ehrmann, M. and Fratzscher, M. (2007), Communication by Central Bank Committee 
Members: Different Strategies, Same Effectiveness? Journal of Money, Credit, and 
Banking 39 (2–3), 509–541. 
Engle, R. F. (1982), Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with Estimates of the 
Variance of United Kingdom Inflation, Econometrica 50 (4), 987–1008. 
Forbes, K. and Rigobon, R. (2002), No Contagion, Only Interdependence: Measuring Stock 
Market Co-Movements, Journal of Finance 57 (5), 2223–2261. 
Gurtner, F. J. (2004), Why Did Argentina’s Currency Board Collapse? World Economy 27 
(5), 679–697. 
Hayo, B. and Kutan, A. M. (2005), IMF-Related News and Emerging Financial Markets, 
Journal of International Money and Finance 24 (7), 1126–1142. 15 
Hayo, B., Kutan, A. M., and Neuenkirch, M. (2008), Financial Market Reaction to Federal 
Reserve Communications: Does the Crisis Make a Difference? MAGKS Joint Discussion 
Paper Series in Economics No. 08-2008. 
Hendry, D. F. (2000), Econometrics: Alchemy or Science? Essays in Econometric 
Methodology, New Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lucca, D. O. and Trebbi, F. (2009), Measuring Central Bank Communication: An Automated 
Approach with Application to FOMC Statements, NBER Working Paper 14468. 
Robitaille, P. and Roush, J. (2006), How Do FOMC Actions and U.S. Macroeconomic Data 
Announcements Move Brazilian Sovereign Yield Spreads and Stock Prices? Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Papers No. 
868. 
Wolf, H. C., Ghosh, A. R., Berger, H., and Gulde, A.-M. (2008), Currency Boards in 
Retrospect and Prospect, Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press. 
Wongswan, J. (2006), Transmission of Information Across International Equity Markets, 
Review of Financial Studies 19 (4), 1157–1189. 
Wongswan, J. (2009), The Response of Global Equity Indexes to U.S. Monetary Policy 
Announcements, Journal of International Money and Finance 28 (2), 344–365. 16 
Appendix 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics for Currency Board Subsample (January 1998–June 2001) 
   3-Month Peso 3-Month Dollar Merval
Observations  840   840   840 
Mean 0.006  0.001  –0.037 
Standard Deviation  0.796  0.310  2.376 
Skewness 5.006  4.847  0.028 
Excess Kurtosis  71.120  68.644  4.289 
Minimum –4.563  –2.063  –13.323 
Maximum 11.688    4.563    12.260 




Table A2: Descriptive Statistics for Floating Exchange Rate Subsample (January 2002–July 2007) 
   3-Month Peso Merval ARS/USD
Observations  1107   1107   1107 
Mean –0.005  0.144  –0.006 
Standard Deviation  0.190  1.723  0.476 
Skewness 3.490  –0.362  0.101 
Excess Kurtosis  63.536  2.419  11.459 
Minimum –1.063  –8.627  –3.428 
Maximum  2.750   6.701   3.187 
Notes: Number of observations: 1,106. 